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Abstract. In this paper, it is argued that negotiation can be regarded as a socio-
cognitive process for the transformation of joint commitments in multi-agent 
environments. To this end, a quantified multi-modal logical language is 
developed for reasoning about and representing agents’ mental attitudes. 
Drawing on this language, negotiation is formalised using the classical 
axiomatic-deductive methodology for theory building. Assumptions are 
presented, and properties discussed on a proof-theoretic basis. The explanatory 
breadth of the formalism is illustrated by looking at its applicability in 
situations in which agents are boundedly rational, have asymmetric and 
incomplete information, are motivated by conflicting interests, and behave 
opportunistically.  
1 Introduction 
Recent advances in distributed artificial intelligence (DAI), social networks, cognitive 
sciences, and organisation theory have led to a new perspective on multi-agent 
systems (MASs) that takes into account both their computational nature and the 
underlying social and knowledge networks [7, 12, 22, 35]. The hallmark of this 
perspective is the idea that cognition occurs at multiple levels, not only within the 
individual agent, but also as an emergent phenomenon from the interaction among 
multiple agents. Drawing on this view, in this paper we develop a theory of 
negotiation in a multi-agent setting, where mechanisms of social behaviour are 
predicated on a fully explicated model of the agents’ cognition at both the individual 
and the joint level. At the heart of our theory lies the conceptualisation of sociality in 
terms of higher-order joint mental attitudes and behaviours that rest on and transcend 
the individual mental attitudes and behaviours of cognitively and socially 
interconnected agents. Building on this conceptual framework, this paper will show 
how it is possible to take some steps towards a new account of the cognitive 
foundations of pluralism in MASs [6, 34]. This is the main theoretical contribution of 
our work, besides its aim of presenting a new conception of negotiation within a 
multi-agent environment.  
Our approach is to conceptualise basic principles governing intelligent 
communities of artificial agents who negotiate to achieve a common objective. Such 
principles provide specifications for the design of artificial agents, and approximate a 
theory of human negotiation. As a result, to the extent that it provides assistance to practitioners interested in building distributed agent architectures, this paper is mainly 
intended to contribute to DAI research. However, in its emphasis on exploring and 
formally specifying a number of important cognitive and behavioural properties of 
social agenthood, our work also contributes to organisation theory and cognitive 
science. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 a quantified multi-
modal logical language will be presented that draws on and extends standard Belief-
Desire-Intention (BDI) logics [11, 31, 35]. Drawing on this language, negotiation will 
be formalised, using the classical axiomatic-deductive methodology for theory 
building [27]. In section 3 a number of assumptions about agents’ behavioural and 
cognitive processes during negotiation will be presented, and in section 4 some 
properties of the formalism will be examined on a proof-theoretic basis. Finally, very 
much in the spirit advocated by a number of scholars in computational organisation 
science [5, 7], in section 5 an attempt will be made to summarise and discuss our 
major findings in terms of their contributions towards an interdisciplinary integration 
of methods, principles and research questions from differing disciplines, such as 
computer science, DAI, organisation theory, economics, and sociology.  
2 The Logical Language 
This section gives an overview of the formal framework that will be used throughout 
the remainder of the paper. The logic is a simplified version of what we developed in 
[23], to which the reader should refer for a complete formal definition. The formalism 
used is a first-order, linear-time, quantified, many-sorted, multi-modal logic for 
reasoning about agents, groups, actions, and mental attitudes, with explicit reference 
to time points and intervals.  
First, a brief description of the model of time that underpins our logic. Every 
occurrence of a formula φ is stamped with a time ti, written φ(ti), meaning that φ holds 
at time ti
1. Time is taken to be composed of points and, for simplicity, is assumed to 
be discrete and linear [3]. For time point ti, ti + 1 is the time point that increments ti; 
that is, ti + 1 is the time point obtained by extending ti by a time point. Temporal 
intervals are defined as pairs of points. Thus, for example, φ(6, 8) means that φ is 
satisfied at time points 6, 7, and 8. Furthermore, intervals of the form (ti, ti) can 
equally be written as time points.  
The logic is many-sorted: terms come in six sorts. First, we have terms that denote 
agents, and we use ai, aj, … as variables ranging over individual agents. Second, we 
have terms that denote groups of agents, and we use gri, grj, … as variables ranging 
over such groups. A group of agents is simply a non-empty subset of the set of agents. 
Third, we have terms that denote time points, and we use ti,  tj, … and so on as 
variables ranging over time points. Fourth, we have terms that denote temporal 
intervals, defined as pairs of time points, and we use ii, ij, … as variables ranging over 
time intervals. Fifth, we have terms that denote actions, and we use ei,  ej, … as 
variables ranging over actions. Finally, we have terms that denote generic objects in 
                                                           
1 We assume that a missing temporal term in a well-formed formula is the same as the closest 
temporal term to its right.  the environment (e.g. tables, blocks, and so on), and we use oi, oj, … as variables 
ranging over objects. 
The language includes first-order equality: a formula (τ = τ’) will be true if τ and τ' 
denote the same individual. The operators ¬ (not) and ∨ (or) have classical semantics, 
as does the universal quantifier ∀. The remaining classical connectives and existential 
quantifier are assumed to be introduced as abbreviations, in the obvious way. We also 
use the punctuation symbols ")", "(", "[", "]", and comma ",". With the "∈" operator, 
we relate agents to groups: ai ∈ gri means that the agent denoted by ai is a member of 
the group denoted by gri. The operator Singleton(gri, ai)(ti) means that gri at ti is a 
singleton group with ai as the only member. For arbitrary ai, e i,  ti, we have: 
Singleton(gri, ai)(ti) ≡ ∀ aj  (aj ∈ gri)(ti) ⊃ (aj = ai)(ti). 
To express the occurrence of an action in the world, our language includes the 
operator Occurs(ei)(ti), which means that action ei happens at time ti. Furthermore, we 
have action expressions that depend on the truth or falsity of formulae: Occurs(φ?)(ti) 
means that φ  is satisfied at ti. Actions may be performed by an individual agent 
(single-agent actions) or by a group of agents (multi-agent actions). For simplicity, we 
assume that an action is either a single-agent or a multi-agent action, but not both. A 
sentence of the form Agts(gri, ei)(ti) states that at ti the group denoted by gri are the 
agents required to perform the action denoted by ei. To express that agent ai is the 
only agent of ei at ti, we have (for arbitrary ai, e i, ti): Agt(ai, ei) (ti) ≡ ∀ gri Agts(gri, 
ei)(ti)⊃ Singleton(gri, ai)(ti). 
To capture the notion of a state-directed action, we now introduce the derived 
operator  plan(gri, ei,  φ(tj))(ti), which expresses the fact that, at time ti, action ei 
represents, for group gri, a plan for making φ true at tj (tj>ti) [19, 23, 36]. For arbitrary 
gri, e i, ti and tj (tj>ti), we have: plan(gri, ei, φ(tj))(ti) ≡ ∃ t h ,tk  (t i ≤ t h ≤ t k < tj) s.t. 
Occurs(ei)(th, tk) ∧ Agts(gri, ei)(th, tk) ∧ [Occurs(ei)(th, tk) ⊃ Occurs(φ?)(tj)]. Informally, 
we say that at time ti action ei is a plan for group gri to make φ true at tj>ti iff: (a) ei 
will occur sometime before tj; (b) gri is the group required to perform ei; and (c) if ei 
occurs, then φ will be satisfied afterwards at tj 2. Finally, for arbitrary ai, e i, ti and tj 
(tj>ti), we have: plan(ai, ei, φ(tj))(ti) ≡ ∀gri plan(gri, ei, φ(tj))(ti) ⊃ Singleton(gri, ai)(ti). 
The above definitions of single-agent and multi-agent plans capture the notions of 
actions that agents or groups eventually perform to satisfy certain states of the world. 
We now want to express the past execution of state-directed actions. To this end, we 
introduce the operator <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(ti), which means that at ti state φ has been 
brought about as a result of the performance of action ei by group gri. For arbitrary gri, 
ei, and ti, we have: <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(ti) ≡ ∃ t j, th (tj ≤ t h < ti) s.t. Occurs(ei)(tj, th)∧ 
Agts(gri, ei)(tj, th)∧ [Occurs(ei)(tj, th) ⊃ Occurs(φ?)(ti)]. Informally, we say that, at time 
ti, φ has been made true as a consequence of the performance of action ei by group gri 
iff: (a) ei occurred sometime in the past; (b) gri was the group required to perform ei; 
and (c) φ was satisfied afterwards at ti as a consequence of the performance of ei. 
Finally, for arbitrary ai, e i and ti, we have: <plan(ai, ei, φ)>(ti) ≡ ∀ gri <plan(gri, ei, 
φ)(ti)> ⊃ Singleton (gri, ai)(ti). 
                                                           
2 For simplicity, we do not adopt a more sophisticated definition of plans (e.g. partial or 
hierarchical non-linear plans [19]). We leave such refinements to future work. The logic is further enriched by a set of modal operators for reasoning about 
agents’ mental attitudes. Drawing on a fairly standard BDI framework [11, 29, 31, 
35], we introduce the operators Bel(ai, φ)(ti) and Int(ai, φ)(ti), which mean that at time 
ti agent ai has, respectively, a belief that φ holds and an intention towards φ, where φ is 
a well-formed formula. Beliefs may concern facts of the world and can be nested, 
namely they can be introspective or have others’ mental attitudes as their arguments. 
Also, beliefs may be incomplete. The formal semantics for beliefs are a natural 
extension of the traditional Hintikka’s possible-worlds semantics [18]. The restrictions 
imposed on the belief-accessibility relation ensure a belief axiomatisation of KD45 
(corresponding to a “Weak S5 modal logic”), which thus implies that beliefs are 
consistent and closed under consequence, and that agents are aware of what they do 
and do not believe [9]. Finally, an agent's intention represents the states of the world 
that the agent is "self-committed" to achieving or maintaining [0]. Like beliefs, 
intentions can be nested, and their semantics are given in terms of possible worlds. 
Restrictions on the intention-accessibility relation ensure that the logic of intentions 
validates axioms K and D, which thus implies that intentions are consistent and closed 
under consequence. Finally, we introduce a weak realism constraint ensuring that 
agents' intentions do not contradict their beliefs [29]. 
In addition to beliefs and intentions, agents have local preferences. The operator 
Pref(ai, φ, ψ)(ti) means that at time ti agent ai prefers φ over ψ, where φ and ψ are 
well-formed formulae. Preferences can be nested. The semantics for preferences are 
given in terms of closest worlds (see [4] and [23] for details). Our language also 
contains the operator Comm(ai, gri, ei)(ti), which means that at time ti agent ai is 
committed towards group gri to performing action ei [8]. Building on this, we 
introduce the derived operator Comm(ai, gri, φ(tj))(ti) to express the commitment that 
agent ai has towards group gri to making φ true at tj (tj>ti) [15, 23]. For arbitrary ai, gri, 
ti and tj  (tj>ti), we have: Comm(ai, gri,  φ(tj))(ti)  ≡  ∃ e i  s.t. [Comm(ai, gri, ei)(ti)  ∧ 
(plan(ai, ei, φ(tj))(ti) ∨ ∃ ej,∃ tk (ti < tk < tj) s.t. (plan(ai, ei, plan(gri, ej, φ(tj))(tk))(ti) ∨ 
plan(ai, ei, plan({gri, ai}, ej, φ(tj))(tk))(ti)))]. Informally, we say that at ti agent ai is 
socially committed towards group gri to making φ true at tj>ti iff there is at least one 
action ei such that at ti: (i) ai is committed towards gri to performing ei; and (ii) either 
ei is a plan for ai to achieve φ at tj; or (iii) ei is a plan for ai to allow gri to achieve φ at 
tj; or (iv) ei is a plan for ai to allow gri and ai to achieve φ collaboratively at tj.  
In addition to individual agents' attitudes, we now introduce joint mental attitudes. 
First, our language includes the modal operator M-BEL (gri, φ)(ti), which means that, 
at time ti, group gri has a mutual belief that φ holds. Crudely, a mutual belief can be 
defined as an infinite conjunction of an agent’s belief about an agent’s belief about an 
agent’s belief and so forth, that a proposition holds [12]. To define the semantics for 
mutual beliefs, we introduce the operator E-BEL (gri, φ) (ti), which means that, at time 
ti, every agent in gri believes that φ holds. For arbitrary gri and ti, we have: E-BEL (gri, 
φ)(ti) ≡ ∀ai ∈ gri Bel (ai, φ)(ti). If k ∈ N such that k > 0, we define E-BEL
k(gri, φ)(ti) 
inductively in the following way. Let E-BEL
k(gri,  φ)(ti)  be an abbreviation for E-
BEL(gri, φ)(ti) if k = 1, and for E-BEL (gri, E-BEL
k-1(gri, φ))(ti) otherwise. Thus, we 
define mutual beliefs as follows: M-BEL (gri, φ)(ti) ≡ ∧k>0 E-BEL
k (gri, φ)(ti) [35, 36]. 
Furthermore, to express the notion of joint intentions, we introduce the operator J-
INT(gri, φ)(ti), which means that at time ti group gri holds a joint intention towards φ. Informally, we say that a group has a joint intention towards φ iff: (a) it is true (and 
mutual belief in gri) that each member has the intention towards φ; and (b) it is true 
(and mutual belief in gri) that each member intends that the other members have an 
intention towards φ. Formally, for arbitrary gri and ti, we have: J-INT(gri, φ)(ti) ≡ E-
INT(gri,  φ)(ti)  ∧ M-BEL(gri, E-INT(gri,  φ))(ti)  ∧ E-INT(gri, E-INT(gri,  φ))(ti)  ∧ M-
BEL(gri, E-INT(gri, E-INT(gri, φ)))(ti), where E-INT (gri, φ)(ti) ≡ ∀ai ∈ gri Int (ai, 
φ)(ti). 
Finally, we can give a formalisation of the notion of joint commitment [8, 12, 15, 
23]. We say that, at time ti, a group gri has a joint commitment to making φ true at tj 
(tj>ti) iff: (i) in gri it is mutually believed that φ will be true at tj; (ii) gri has the joint 
intention that φ will be true at tj; (iii) it is true (and mutual belief in gri) that each 
member of gri is socially committed towards gri to making φ true at tj; and (iv) it is 
true (and mutual belief in gri) that (ii) will continue to hold until it is mutually 
believed in gri either that φ will not be true at tj, or that at least one of the members 
drops its commitment towards gri to making φ true at tj. Formally, for arbitrary gri, ti 
and tj (tj>ti), we have: 
J-COMM(gri,  φ(tj))(ti)≡ M-BEL(gri,  φ(tj))(ti)  ∧ J-INT(gri,  φ(tj))(ti)  ∧  ∀ai  ∈ gri 
[Comm(ai, gri, φ(tj)) ∧ M-BEL(gri, Comm(ai, gri, φ(tj)))](ti) ∧ γ (ti) ∧ M-BEL(gri, γ) (ti), 
where γ  ≡ [J-INT(gri, φ(tj))(ti, tj) ∨ ∃ tk (ti < tk ≤ tj) s.t. ((M-BEL(gri, ¬φ(tj))∨∃ ai∈ gri 
s.t. (¬ Comm(ai, gri, φ(tj)) ∧ M-BEL(gri, ¬ Comm(ai, gri, φ(tj)))))(tk)∧∀ th (ti ≤ th <  tk) 
J-INT(gri, φ(tj)) (th))]. 
3 A Model of Negotiation 
Building on the language outlined above, we will now formalise a number of 
assumptions that are intended to model the agents’ cognition and social behaviour 
during negotiation [23, 34]. Negotiation is here conceived of as a socio-cognitive 
process for the transformation of commitments in a social setting comprising 
cognitive agents [23]. This conception can be articulated into two core ideas. First, 
negotiation is seen as grounded on a joint commitment among the members of a 
group to achieving a state of the world3. Second, negotiation is regarded as primarily 
aimed at generating a joint commitment among the agents to acting according to a 
joint plan of action. Thus, motivated by a prior joint commitment, the agents are 
moved into negotiation. In turn, negotiation transforms the agents’ prior joint 
commitment towards a state into a derived joint commitment towards a plan that is a 
means for achieving that state. For example, in an economic transaction, both the 
buyer and the seller are moved into negotiation by a prior joint commitment to having 
a good (or service) delivered from the seller to the buyer, and the counter-value from 
                                                           
3 How this commitment is generated is not our concern in this paper. the buyer to the seller. If successful, negotiation will transform the prior joint 
commitment into a new conclusive commitment leading the buyer and the seller to 
perform a plan that specifies the conditions (e.g. price, time, place, quality, 
guarantees) at which the economic transaction is to be finalised.  
As it stands, this perspective is consistent with the idea that negotiation is 
inherently intertwined with the process of practical reasoning typically undertaken in 
social settings [2, 23]. In fact, the transformation of commitments that negotiation 
brings about can be seen as instrumental to the collaborative search for a solution to a 
common practical problem. The common problem concerns what is to be done by a 
group to fulfil a prior joint commitment towards an end; the agreed solution reflects a 
conclusive joint commitment towards the means to secure the end.  
Against this background, our model is premised on the assumption that, before 
negotiation can start, agents need to be jointly committed towards a state. According 
to the definition given in Section 2, a joint commitment that a group gri holds towards 
φ evokes a shared mental state in which, among other conditions, each member 
believes that φ is possible. In turn, this rests on the agents’ belief that gri: (i) either can 
achieve φ directly; or (ii) can acquire the ability to achieve φ [23]. To say that a joint 
commitment must reflect either condition (i) or (ii) conveys the idea that, as long as a 
group has committed itself to achieve a state, it has committed itself to find the means 
to bring about that state, and each member’s believing that there are no such means, 
either inside or outside the group, would contradict their joint commitment. On the 
one hand, should condition (i) be satisfied, then the agents would be aware of at least 
one plan that gri can perform to attain φ. On the other, should condition (ii) be 
satisfied, the agents would be aware of at least one plan that gri can perform to get 
closer to φ. This means that the agents believe they can discover how to achieve φ and 
eventually come up with a plan for φ. However, once a joint commitment has been 
formed, the agents may update their mental states and come to believe they are unable 
not only to fulfil their commitment directly but also to discover how to fulfil it. For 
example, they may overestimate their cognitive abilities and, ultimately, find out that 
the fulfilment of their joint commitment is beyond their abilities. In this case, no 
negotiation occurs since no plan is proposed as a potential candidate for being agreed 
upon within the group. Therefore, the minimum condition required in order for 
negotiation to take place is that at least one agent is aware of at least one plan that the 
group can perform to fulfil its joint commitment. This minimum condition is captured 
by Assumption 1.  
 
Assumption 1. Given a group of agents jointly committed to achieving φ, a state will 
follow in which the group will hold its commitment iff at least one of the agents 
maintains a belief about a plan that the group might perform to attain φ: 
 
∀ gri, ∀ ti, tj  (t j>ti) J-COMM (gri, φ(tj)) (ti) ⊃ ∃ tk (ti < tk < tj) s.t. [J-COMM (gri, 
φ(tj)) (ti, tk) ⇔ ∃ ai∈ gri,∃ ei s.t. Bel(ai, plan(gri, ei, φ(tj)))(tk)] 
 
Informally, Assumption 1 means that the agents will not keep their joint 
commitment forever. They will eventually drop their commitment unless, before the 
time the commitment is to be satisfied, at least one member of the group comes to fully represent in its mind a potential candidate solution (i.e., a plan) for fulfilling it4. 
This allows negotiation to start. In fact, the agent’s mental representation of a plan is 
the first step towards the generation and communication of a proposal to the other 
members of the group. However, before a proposal is forwarded, a practical 
judgement needs to be generated. To this end, the agent will keep trying to discover 
other possible alternative plans the group may perform [30]. Ultimately, the agent will 
typically come up with the belief that either there is only one possible plan that the 
group can execute, or that there are other alternative plans. In the former case, the 
agent will generate a necessity-based practical judgement: namely, the belief that, 
unless a specific plan is performed, the group cannot fulfil its joint commitment. In 
the latter case, the agent will have to evaluate and make a choice among the possible 
plans [2, 10, 16, 30]. Ultimately, this choice leads the agent to form a preference-
based practical judgement: namely, the agent’s preference that the group performs a 
plan, among a set of alternative feasible ones, based on the belief that the preferred 
plan will most satisfactorily enable the group to realise its joint commitment [23]. The 
generation of necessity- and preference-based judgements is formalised in 
Assumption 2.  
 
Assumption 2. Should an agent hold a belief about a feasible plan, it will also 
generate a practical judgement:  
 
∀ gri,∀ ti, tj (tj>ti) [J-COMM (gri, φ(tj)) (ti) ∧ ∃ ai∈ gri, ∃ ei s.t. Bel(ai, plan(gri, ei, 
φ(tj)))(ti)] ⊃ Bel(ai, (φ(tj) ⇔ <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj)))(ti) ∨ ∀ ej (ej ≠ ei) [Bel(ai, plan(gri, 
ej, φ(tj))) ⊃ Pref(ai, <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj), <plan(gri, ej, φ)>(tj))] (ti) ∨ ∃ ek (ek ≠ ei) s.t. 
[Bel(ai, plan(gri, ek, φ(tj)))(ti) ∧ ∀ e j (ej ≠ e k) [Bel(ai, plan(gri, ej, φ(tj))) ⊃ Pref(ai, 
<plan(gri, ek, φ)>(tj), <plan(gri, ej, φ)>(tj))] (ti)] 
 
Informally, Assumption 2 means that if an agent is aware of a feasible plan for 
fulfilling the group’s joint commitment, that agent will: (i) either believe that that plan 
is the only feasible one; or (ii) express the preference that the group performs that or 
another feasible plan among alternative feasible ones. Assumption 2 expresses the 
first two basic components of what is known as the agent’s social practical inference. 
By this we mean the structure of the reasoning process that a member of a jointly 
committed group undertakes in order to give an answer to a practical problem [2, 10, 
33]. On the one hand, the first conjunct of the antecedent of the above material 
implication represents the major motivational premise of the agent’s inference, 
namely the joint commitment (and the agent’s intention [23]) towards a state. On the 
other, the consequent suggests possible instantiations of the minor doxastic premise of 
the agent’s inference. Typically, the minor premise contains a practical judgement 
suggesting a means for satisfying the joint commitment expressed within the major 
premise. The role of this judgement is to trigger the cognitive path leading the agent 
from the prior intention to achieve a state to a conclusive intention favouring the 
performance of a plan that brings about that state. This intention represents the 
conclusion of the agent’s inference. While Assumption 2 was intended to formalise 
                                                           
4 A solution to a practical problem may also be emergent from a path of partial  plans. 
However, the emergent properties of negotiation fall outside the scope of this work. the cognitive link between the two first inferential premises, Assumptions 3 and 4 
formalise the generation of the conclusive inferential intention. 
 
Assumption 3. Should an agent hold a necessity-based practical judgement favouring 
a plan, it will also generate the intention that the group performs that plan: 
 
∀ gri,∀ t i, tj (tj > ti) [J-COMM (gri, φ(tj)) (ti) ∧ ∃ a i∈ gri,∃ e i s.t. (Bel(ai, (φ(tj) ⇔ 
<plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj)))(ti)] ⊃ Int(ai, <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj))(ti) 
 
Informally, Assumption 3 means that whenever an agent believes that there is only 
one plan that the group can perform to fulfil its commitment, it will conclude its 
social practical inference by generating the intention favouring that plan. However, 
the agent may also believe there is more than one feasible plan and, among the 
feasible ones, it may express a preference. Should an agreement have already been 
reached, the agent may decide to compromise over its preferences for the sake of the 
group (see section 4.1). However, when an agreement is still to be made, we expect 
the agent who expresses a preference for a plan to stick to it and generate an intention 
favouring that plan. The transformation of a preference-based practical judgement 
into the corresponding inferential intention is formalised in Assumption 4.  
 
Assumption 4. Before an agreement is made, should an agent hold a preference-
based practical judgement favouring a feasible plan, it will also generate the intention 
that the group performs that plan: 
 
∀ gri,∀ ti, tj (tj>ti) [J-COMM (gri, φ(tj)) (ti) ∧ ¬∃ ei s.t. J-COMM(gri, <plan(gri, ei, 
φ)>(tj))(ti) ∧ ∃ a i∈ gri,∃ e i s.t. [Bel(ai, plan(gri, ei, φ(tj)))(ti) ∧ ∀ e j (ej ≠ e i) [Bel(ai, 
plan(gri, ej, φ(tj))) ⊃ Pref(ai, <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj), <plan(gri, ej, φ)>(tj))] (ti)] ⊃ Int(ai, 
<plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj)) (ti) 
 
Informally, Assumption 4 means that whenever an agent prefers a plan over a 
range of alternative feasible ones, and an agreement is still to be reached within the 
group, then the agent will form the intention favouring the preferred plan. Both this 
preference-based intention and the necessity-based one pave the way for subsequent 
socio-cognitive processes [34]. In fact, in order for a group to successfully undertake 
negotiation, the members’ inferential intentions must be socially interconnected in 
such a way that an agreement can be reached. This motivates a subsequent inter-agent 
coordination process. Once one of the agents has generated an intention favouring 
some plan, we expect that agent to generate the intention to bring about a state in 
which all its acquaintances know about that plan [36]. This is expressed in 
Assumption 5. 
 
Assumption 5. Should an agent intend that the group performs a plan, it will also 
intend to bring about a state where every member is aware of this:  
 
∀gri,∀ t i, tj (tj>ti) [J-COMM(gri, φ(tj))(ti) ∧ ∃ a i∈ gri, ∃ e i s.t. Int(ai, <plan(gri, ei, 
φ)>(tj))(ti)]⊃ ∀aj ∈ gri Int(ai, Bel(aj, Int(ai, <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj)))) (ti) 
 Informally, an agent’s intention to make the group perform a plan leads the agent 
to exert social influence upon its acquaintances’ mental states. In Assumption 5 this 
has been formalised through a nested modal operator: the intention about somebody’s 
belief about somebody’s intention. In most cases, the agent attempts to impact upon 
the other members’ mental states by sending a message and letting them know about 
the plan it favours. This plan will be a candidate for being moved up to an agreed-
upon plan status.  
The intention to let somebody know something can be regarded as an instantiation 
of a more general attitude: the intention to make somebody adopt a mental attitude 
[24]. This is a key construct that lies at the heart of most social processes and inter-
agent social behaviours. In fact, it can be seen as the cognitive source of a variety of 
social influence processes that agents exert in order to impact upon each other’s 
mental states. If social influence is successful, the agent who is subjected to it will 
typically change its mental state and adopt new socially motivated mental attitudes. 
These are attitudes that are inherently motivated by social behaviour and rooted in the 
agents’ disposition to represent each other in intentional terms [14]. In particular, 
when social influence rests on an agent's intending to let another know something, the 
typical outcome is the latter's adoption of a socially motivated belief. 
In their attempts to exert social influence, agents may fail to let others know about 
the plans they favour. Agents may simply lack an appropriate communication 
channel, or speak different languages. In this case, agents fail to influence one 
another, and the agreement is procrastinated, if not hampered. However, 
communication may also be effective and social influence may succeed. In this case, 
once the agents have come to know about one of their acquaintances' proposals, they 
will update their beliefs and evaluate the message received. Each agent will then act 
in differing ways depending on the extent to which the proposal is consistent with its 
own beliefs, intentions, preferences, etc. Specifically, should an agent keep its 
commitment to the group, it may react in two different ways. First, it may agree with 
its acquaintance and endorse the intention that the group performs the proposed plan. 
Second, it may disagree, and reject the proposal [20, 25]. In this case, should the 
agent support a different plan, it will also generate the corresponding intention to 
make all the other members aware of this (Assumption 5). To this end, the agent will 
typically generate and communicate a counter-proposal [16, 28]. The process then 
iterates with all the other agents' evaluating the counter-proposal and, ultimately, with 
their rejection or acceptance.  
The last assumption we want to make about agents’ behaviour is concerned with 
the generation of a final agreement. In this respect, we note that, even after a number 
of proposals and counter-proposals have been forwarded, negotiation may still fail. 
The agents may simply be unable to reach an agreement, due to some irreconcilable 
differences. However, negotiation may also succeed and end up with an agreement 
based on a joint commitment to jointly performing a plan. In this case, before a 
conclusive joint commitment is generated, we expect all the agents to endorse the 
same intention about the plan to be performed5. However, all the agents' sharing the 
same intention is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agreement to be 
                                                           
5 Note that we generalise over specific mechanisms of agreement-generation (e.g. democratic 
voting mechanisms; majority rules; appealing to authority) which do not necessarily reflect 
each member’s sharing the same intention [32]. reached. In fact, for example, the agents may be unable to establish a mutual belief 
that they share the same intention, and this does not enable them to generate a joint 
intention, and therefore a joint commitment supporting a common plan (section 2) 
[23, 36]. Therefore, if we want to be able to say that negotiation concludes 
successfully when the agents favour the same plan, we need to make another 
assumption about agents’ behaviour. More precisely, we need to assume that when 
agents share the same intention supporting a plan, they are also successful in 
establishing a shared mental state from which a joint commitment to performing that 
plan ensues. This is formalised in Assumption 6. 
 
Assumption 6. If all the group members share the intention that the group performs a 
given plan, they will become jointly committed to performing that plan: 
 
∀gri, ∀ e i,∀ t i, tj (tj>ti) [J-COMM(gri, φ(tj))(ti) ∧ ∀ai ∈ gri Int(ai, <plan(gri, ei, 
φ)>(tj))(ti)]⊃ J-COMM(gri, <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj))(ti) 
 
Assumption 6 formalises the core idea underpinning our model, namely the fact 
that negotiation can be regarded as a transformation of commitments. When 
successful, negotiation generates an agreement on a joint plan [28]. An agreement is a 
composite concept that reflects what practical judgements the agents have brought 
about via practical reasoning and to what extent the agents have compromised with 
one another over their own views and preferences. Furthermore, an agreement reflects 
a joint commitment to acting in accordance with the agreed-upon plan. Coming to an 
agreement thus transforms a joint commitment towards a state into a joint 
commitment to performing a plan for achieving that state. This transformation of 
commitments is what constitutes the essence of negotiation.  
4 Properties of the Model 
Drawing on the classical axiomatic-deductive methodology for theory building [27], 
in this section properties of the model will be discussed and formalised. In doing so, 
by exploring some major problems occurring in real-world negotiations, it will be 
shown how it is possible to make a step towards a cross-fertilisation among different 
disciplines, and in particular mainstream DAI and organization theory.  
4.1 Cognition at the Individual and the Joint Level 
The objective of this section is to examine properties concerning the relationship 
between the negotiated agreement and the individual mental attitudes. First, we note 
that at the heart of an agreement lie the individual agents’ intentions. Should 
negotiation be successful, not only will the agents share an intention towards an end, 
but they will also share an intention towards the means to secure that end.  
 
Property 1. Agreement rests on and transcends individual intentions: 
  ∀gri,∀ei,∀ t i, tj (tj>ti) [J-COMM(gri,  φ(tj))(ti)∧ J-COMM(gri,<plan(gri, ei, 
φ)>(tj))(ti)] ⊃ ∀ai ∈ gri [Int(ai, φ(tj)) (ti) ∧ Int(ai, <plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj)) (ti)] 
 
This property follows from the definition of joint commitment (see section 2 and 
[23]). Informally, if any two agents come to an agreement, they both endorse the same 
intention towards a state and a plan for achieving that state. Conversely, sharing 
identical intentions does not imply that negotiation has been carried out and an 
agreement has been reached (i.e., the implication above is unidirectional). The reason 
for this is quite simple. Having identical intentions is not sufficient for a joint 
commitment to take place [23]. As a result, the conjunction of the agents’ intentions 
towards a state and a plan does not imply the joint commitments towards that state 
and that plan, which in our formalisation represent, respectively, the pre-condition 
and the ultimate outcome of negotiation.  
While Property 1 is concerned with the implications of an agreement in terms of 
the agents’ intentions, Property 2 explores the implications of sharing identical 
intentions in terms of the agents’ practical judgements. Even though, in order to reach 
an agreement, agents are expected to change their mental states until they share the 
same intention about a plan, nonetheless they are not required to adapt their 
preferences to each other in a consistent manner. In fact, they might agree and still 
have divergent preferences and personal views as to what is the most appropriate plan 
the group should perform. 
 
Property 2. Agreement about a plan does not rest on identical preference-based 
practical judgements favouring that plan: 
 
∀gri,∀ei,  ∀ t i, tj (tj>ti)[ J-COMM(gri,  φ(tj))(ti)  ∧ J-COMM(gri, <plan(gri, ei, 
φ)>(tj))(ti)] ⊃ ∀ai ∈ gri ∀ ej (ej ≠ ei) [Bel(ai, plan(gri, ej, φ(tj))) ⊃ Pref(ai, <plan(gri, ei, 
φ)>(tj), <plan(gri, ej, φ)>(tj))] (ti) 
 
The antecedent does not imply the consequent because, should the antecedent be 
satisfied, and the agents share the same intentions towards a state and the performance 
of a plan (Property 1), one of the agents might still prefer that the group performs 
another plan. This follows from the axiomatisation of intentions and the conditions 
imposed on the intention-accessibility relation (section 2). More specifically, 
intentions are not taken to be constrained by any intention-preference consistency 
schema.  
The fact that the agents who agree about a plan do not necessarily hold a 
preference-based practical judgement favouring that plan, has an interesting 
implication concerning one of the key problems found in real-world negotiations: 
compromising and intention reconsideration. Even though the agents keep their views 
and personal preferences, they nonetheless may need to compromise and drop their 
individual intentions for the sake of the group [32, 35]. Let us suppose that, at time ti, 
group gri has successfully carried out a negotiation regarding a state φ to be achieved 
at tj (tj>ti). Formally, we have: J-COMM(gri, φ(tj))(ti) ∧ J-COMM(gri, <plan(gri, ei, 
φ)>(tj))(ti). Furthermore, suppose that at th<ti one of the agents, say ai, generated a 
preference-based practical judgement favouring a plan, say ej, that is different from the agreed-upon plan ei. Formally, we have: ∃ e j (ej ≠ e i) s.t. [Bel(ai, plan(gri, ej, 
φ(tj)))(th) ∧ ∀ e h (eh ≠ e j) [Bel(ai, plan(gri, eh, φ(tj))) ⊃ Pref(ai, <plan(gri, ej, φ)>(tj), 
<plan(gri, eh, φ)>(tj))] (th)]. Now, according to Property 1, agreement on ei implies 
Int(ai, <plan(gri, ei,  φ)>(tj))(ti). However, according to Assumption 4, if an agent 
holds a preference-based practical judgement before an agreement is made, the agent 
will also generate the corresponding intention favouring that judgement, that is, Int(ai, 
<plan(gri, ej,  φ)>(tj))(th). Thus, if the agent is to comply with the agreement, an 
intention reconsideration must occur leading the agent to drop the intention based on 
its own preference-based practical judgement in order to endorse the intention 
favoured by the group. Endorsing a socially motivated intention to the detriment of an 
internally motivated one thus represents the cognitive implication of the compromises 
that agents are often required to make with one another over their own preferences to 
get to a final agreement and stick to it.  
Compromising and intention reconsideration have often been regarded as 
inherently intertwined with the role and implications of conflict in negotiation [28]. In 
this respect, it has been argued that negotiation is a response to conflict [17]. 
However, it is worth noting that, even though particularly common in most real-world 
scenarios, conflict cannot be seen as a necessary condition that motivates agents into 
negotiation. In the same vein, compromising and intention reconsideration do not 
underpin every real-world negotiation. For example, the agents may share the same 
preferences and intentions without being aware of this. In this case, they need to 
negotiate in order to find out they all agree on what the group should do. Furthermore, 
since here no conflict exists between the agents, they are not expected to compromise 
with one another over their own preferences, nor will they re-consider their 
individually motivated intentions. On a more general level, rather than simply as a 
response to conflict, negotiation occurs whenever the agents do not know whether or 
not they share the same preference/intention as to how to fulfil their joint 
commitment. Negotiation thus is intended to make the agents realise either that they 
already converge or that they need to compromise with one another to overcome their 
divergence. 
4.2 Private Information, Bounded Rationality and Informational Asymmetries 
A key problem in most real-world negotiations is the uncertainty and ambiguity of the 
information needed to reach an agreement. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
in most circumstances different agents have differing relevant private information 
before an agreement is reached. As a result of this, the information that is needed to 
reach an agreement tends to be localised and dispersed among the agents. Second, in 
most real-world scenarios agents are boundedly rational [30]. They have limited 
cognitive ability, imperfect communication skills and their natural languages are 
imprecise. In particular, agents cannot solve arbitrarily complex problems exactly, 
costlessly and instantaneously, they cannot process all the information they have 
simultaneously and accurately, they cannot communicate with one another freely and 
perfectly, and the understanding of messages is often flawed. More specifically, 
determining what information a message conveys, what message should be forwarded 
to whom, and with what methods messages should be forwarded becomes an overwhelmingly large and complex problem. Because information is localised and 
dispersed, and because no one has the cognitive ability to make all the calculations 
needed to retrieve information, the agents cannot account for all the relevant 
information needed to determine the best use of resources and the appropriate 
adaptations. Thus, it is upon the link between informational dispersion and the agents’ 
bounded rationality that rests the problem of informational inaccuracy and 
asymmetry, which, in turn, represents a major obstacle that interferes with the 
possibility of reaching a mutually beneficial agreement [30].  
The following property is precisely intended to give a formalisation of the fact that, 
in most real-word negotiations, the agents’ doxastic representations of their social 
environment are inherently ambiguous. More specifically, Property 3 conveys the 
idea that the negotiating agents’ beliefs about each other’s mental attitudes are not 
deterministically accurate. They are not inevitably true in the same way as they are 
not inevitably false.  
 
Property 3. Agents are boundedly rational in generating and updating their beliefs 
about each other’s intentions: 
 
∀ gri,  ∀ a i, aj∈ gri,  ∀ e i,  ∀ t i, tj (tj>ti)[J-COMM(gri,  φ(tj))(ti)  ∧ Bel(aj, 
Int(ai,<plan(gri, ei,φ)>(tj)))(ti)]⊃ Int(ai,<plan(gri, ei,φ)>(tj))(ti) 
 
The property follows from the fact that beliefs are not taken to be constrained by 
the "knowledge axiom" and, correspondingly, the belief-accessibility relation is not 
taken to be reflexive (Section 2). Therefore, what an agent believes might turn out to 
be false. More specifically, an agent may inaccurately believe that another holds an 
intention that it actually does not.  
Property 3 enables to highlight two complementary conceptualisations of the 
agent's bounded rationality. First, should agent ai generate its belief at time ti, Property 
3 means that this may be inaccurately formed. In fact, the agent may mistakenly 
believe that another holds an intention. This is consistent with what has been argued 
by mainstream organisation and cognitive science, namely that the (human) agent 
typically forms mental models of its environment by using imperfect representations 
that simplify the complexity of spatial, temporal and causal relationships [30]. 
Second, should agent ai generate its belief at some time tj < ti, Property 3 means that, 
not only may beliefs be inaccurately formed, but the agent may also be unable to 
update them once formed. In fact, in this case, the agent may keep maintaining a 
belief that another holds an intention, even though the latter does not hold that 
intention. Here, the agent's limited ability to update its beliefs does not allow it to 
discover every change in its environment that might falsify its cognitive 
representations formed at an earlier stage. Thus, even beliefs that were accurately 
formed may subsequently turn out to be false during the course of negotiation as a 
result of changes in the environment and the agent's limited ability to account for 
them.  4.3 Conflicting Interests and Opportunistic Behaviour 
The property discussed in this section is concerned with another central problem of 
real-world negotiations: opportunistic behaviour and the related issue of motivation. 
Not only have real agents limited cognitive ability. They also have their own private 
interests, which are rarely perfectly aligned with the interests of the other agents with 
whom they need to interact [13]. Divergence of interests, together with bounded 
rationality and information specificity, introduces the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour. Because agents are boundedly rational, they suffer from informational 
distortions that might prevent them from reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. 
However, bounded rationality and informational ambiguity can also be exploited by 
the agents to opportunistically misrepresent or even refuse to reveal relevant private 
information. Typically, agents might exploit their counter-parts’ bounded rationality 
in order to obtain a unilateral advantage and seize a greater share of the fruits of 
negotiation for themselves [21]. Correspondingly, the motivation problem is to ensure 
that the various agents involved in negotiation willingly do their parts in the whole 
undertaking, both communicating information accurately to allow the right agreement 
to be reached and acting as they are expected to act within the group.  
Opportunistic behaviour and motivation are inherently related to each other. In 
fact, should the agents not be sufficiently motivated to act in a way that is beneficial 
to the whole group, they might behave opportunistically and hide relevant private 
information, or even alter it in an effort to have their own interests and objectives 
satisfied at the expense of the others'. This source of inefficiency is often called 
adverse selection, conveying the idea that one party behaves in a way that is 
detrimental, adverse to the interests of the other party [1]. Since agents are aware of 
the fact that their acquaintances cannot possibly have all the relevant information that 
is needed to accurately evaluate the counter-part’s behaviour, they may be induced to 
misbehave and misrepresent their private information in order to have their interests 
fulfilled more quickly or efficiently. In particular, an agent may intend that another 
mistakenly perceives that it has a specific intention about a potential agreement, 
perhaps because this may induce the latter to act in a manner that is beneficial to the 
former [21]. Or, an agent may intend to hide its own strategy to another agent, thus 
deliberately forwarding wrong messages to the latter in an attempt to make it generate 
inaccurate beliefs. These forms of opportunistic misbehaviour are captured in the 
following property. 
 
Property 4. Agents may opportunistically mislead each other into thinking that they 
maintain intentions they actually do not: 
 
∀gri, ∀ai, aj∈ gri, ∀ e i, ∀ t i, tj (tj>ti)[J-COMM(gri, φ(tj))(ti) ∧ Int(ai, Bel(aj, Int(ai, 
<plan(gri, ei,φ)>(tj))))(ti)]⊃ Int(ai,<plan(gri, ei, φ)>(tj))(ti) 
 
The antecedent does not imply the consequent because, although the antecedent is 
satisfied, agent ai might intend that the group performs a plan, say ej, different from ei. 
In this case, the consequent would not be satisfied. More generally, in our 
axiomatisation of agents' mental attitudes (section 2), the nested operator Int(ai, Bel(aj, 
Int(ak, φ)))(ti), expressing the intention about somebody’s belief about somebody’s intention, for arbitrary ai, aj, and ak, is not taken to imply Int(ak, φ)(ti). Thus, an agent’s 
intention that another believes it has an intention favouring a plan does not entail that 
it really intends to favour that plan.  
Intuitively, what Property 4 suggests is that the inaccuracy of agents’ beliefs may 
be the result of somebody else’s opportunistic behaviour. As we noted above, this 
self-interested misbehaviour leading to adverse selection is a form of pre-contractual 
opportunism that arises because of the private information that boundedly rational 
agents have before they reach an agreement [1]. However, besides this, there is 
another form of self-interested misbehaviour, known as moral hazard, that reflects the 
agents’ proclivity to behave opportunistically after an agreement has been made [26]. 
The cognitive roots of this form of post-contractual opportunism can be found in the 
dynamic implications of the agents’ bounded rationality. Not only have agents 
inaccurate information about the world; they are also not perfectly far-sighted [30]. In 
particular, their ability to make agreements is limited by the existence of unforeseen 
circumstances and by the costs and difficulty of deciding in advance what would be 
appropriate to do in every foreseeable contingency. Even in the extreme case, where 
there is no private information before an agreement is made, there may be inadequate 
information afterwards to tell whether the terms of the agreement have been 
honoured, or acquiring that information may be costly. As a result, agreements are 
inevitably incomplete and imperfectly specified, so that the agents involved can 
exploit loopholes to gain an advantage over one another [26]. In addition, as shown 
with the problem of adverse selection, actions that have efficiency consequences are 
not freely observable and so the agent taking them may choose to pursue its private 
interest at others’ expense [21].  
Now, having modelled negotiation and the generation of an agreement in terms of 
a transformation of joint commitments, we can easily show how this form of moral 
hazard can be accounted for in our formalisation. In fact, our conception of 
negotiation can be seen as implicitly reflecting an underpinning form of meta-
agreement, namely an agreement about reaching an agreement. In this respect, being 
jointly committed to negotiating as to how to attain some state means to agree to 
attain that state collaboratively, and therefore to agree to eventually make an 
agreement about the appropriate plan. In the light of this, Property 4 can now be read 
from a different perspective that enables the problem of moral hazard to be accounted 
for. Because boundedly rational agents cannot foresee all the relevant circumstances, 
the agreements they can make are inevitably incomplete. This is true also of a meta-
agreement concerning how to reach an agreement. That is, the prior joint commitment 
to engaging in negotiation cannot conceivably specify all the relevant circumstances 
that might arise during negotiation. This opens the incentive for agents with divergent 
interests to misbehave in such a way that their own private interests can be fulfilled 
with no mutual advantage for the others. Again, this form of misbehaviour is captured 
in our formalism by an agent’s intending that another mistakenly perceives something, 
after a joint commitment has been formed. Since the way in which negotiation is to be 
undertaken cannot be completely specified in advance, the agents, once jointly 
committed, may be induced to misbehave and try to fulfil the joint commitment in a 
self-interested manner. 5 Conclusions 
In this paper we used a BDI logic to formalise agents’ behaviour and cognition during 
negotiation in multi-agent environments. In doing so, we have been motivated by two 
objectives. First, to place the study of negotiation on a more secure and formal 
footing. Second, to develop an empirically satisfactory theory, comprehensive enough 
to account for a number of problems occurring in real-world negotiations. To this end, 
by formalising a number of assumptions, our approach was first, to synthetically 
generalise over specific strategies and tactics that agents might use in different 
domains; second, to analytically specify the key cognitive and social processes that 
underpin most forms of real-world negotiations. In this respect, our perspective differs 
from computational (e.g. [16]) as well as economic and game-theoretic (e.g. [28]) 
approaches to negotiation, whereby a range of tactics, inter-agent behavioural 
patterns, decision and preference functions are formally specified and empirically 
evaluated. Conversely, our work is most closely related to the formalisms described in 
[20], [25] and [36], where negotiation is modelled in terms of the agents’ decision-
making apparatus. However, with respect to these works, our focus has been more on 
the representation of practical inferential processes in terms of a transition between 
mental attitudes, as well as on the analysis of the cognitive foundations of inter-agent 
social influence processes [6, 34].  
In developing our formalisation, we brought some of the major research questions 
in social sciences to bear on the methods and analytical tools advocated by 
mainstream computer science and DAI. For example, we attempted to formalise such 
problems as the agent's bounded rationality, adverse selection and moral hazard, using 
a computational BDI logic. Furthermore, we worked towards a cross-fertilisation 
among research questions suggested by different theoretical perspectives. For 
example, we studied the problem of informational asymmetry, typically addressed by 
economists and organisational scientists [1, 21, 26], by focusing on the agent's 
cognitive architecture, which is a conceptual category imported from DAI [11, 35]. In 
this vein, by building a new conception of negotiation upon the interconnections 
among different disciplines, in this paper we took some steps towards a unified 
theoretical and methodological paradigm for modelling the cognitive foundations of 
pluralism in MASs. 
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